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Abstract: The precautionary principle is controversial, and critics invoke the need to wait for
“sound science” before taking “costly” regulatory action. For human health effects, epi-
demiologic results are often considered more valuable than toxicologic studies in animals.
Direct human evidence on the endocrine effects of environmental chemicals has been slow
to accumulate because of inherent sample size limitations of exposed populations and over-
conservative hypothesis testing approaches. Moreover, human health outcomes may take
decades to emerge. Indeed, even huge population-based studies of hormone replacement
therapy have been inconclusive regarding both benefits and risks. This paper argues that cer-
tain intrinsic standard epidemiologic methods are stacked to avoid making a type I error.
Moreover, these combine with extrinsic limitations (long latency, high cost), leading me to
conclude that reliance solely on epidemiology to provide definitive answers, will almost in-
evitably delay the discovery of meaningful associations warranting timely action for protec-
tion of public health. There are several ways in which the inherent conservatism of epidemi-
ology is arrayed against preventative regulatory steps, hence a precautionary approach is
warranted while awaiting the results of additional studies which for various reasons may be
very long delayed or even impossible. 
INTRODUCTION
Although formally established in the literature only during the 1990s, the precautionary principle is
firmly entrenched in society, dating back to antiquity. Proverbs such as “better safe than sorry” and “ an
ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure” are articulations of the precautionary principle. The pre-
cautionary principle emerged mainly in the context of new technologies such as bovine growth hormone
and genetically modified organisms, but can also be extended to regulation of environmental pollutants
including endocrine active substances. Applied to new technologies with uncertain adverse outcomes,
it behooves those who will profit from a proposed technology to demonstrate conclusively its safety or
that its benefits will outweigh its harm. In its most frequent incarnation, it means that the existence of
uncertainties, unresolved facts, or the need for more research shall not be invoked to delay controls or
regulatory action, particularly when the consequences of inaction or delay are serious or irreversible. 
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proach to protect the environment…. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, scien-
tific uncertainty shall not be used to postpone cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degra-
dation.” Or in simplest terms a potential hazard is not innocent until proven guilty. It is commonly stated
that the precautionary principle has been adopted in Europe but abjured in the United States. Actually,
a number of U.S. environmental statutes embody precautionary language. For example, the Toxic
Substances Control Act (1977): “among the many chemical substances and mixtures which are con-
stantly being developed and produced, there are some whose manufacture, processing, distribution in
commerce, use, or disposal may present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment…”
Agencies responsible for regulating environmental pollution on both the national and interna-
tional scale set emissions standards or contaminant levels based, in part, on the results of scientific stud-
ies published in the peer-reviewed literature. Yet, even science-based standard setting is often affected
by economic and technical considerations. Most agencies, the general public, and particularly scientists,
like to think that standards are based primarily on science and that as new scientific information be-
comes available, standards will be revised. This, however, is not always (or even often) the case. In the
United States, for example, the Occupational Safety and Health Standards are mostly based on pre-
1970s science—attempts to update them having been stayed in court. Moreover, for some kinds of con-
taminants, particularly where effects are subtle or occur at very low levels, or where funding is not di-
rected, scientific data are slow to accumulate. 
Therefore, the precautionary principle is increasingly invoked to take regulatory action in the ab-
sence of incontrovertible scientific data demonstrating harm. The precautionary principle is considered
controversial, and indeed those who oppose or caution about its application usually refer to it in the ex-
treme sense of complete banning of a new technology or a toxic material. However, in practice precau-
tion represents a spectrum of actions ranging from those that can be clearly and confidently based on
adequate and sound data to interim actions taken while additional data are pending. Moreover, precau-
tionary actions are themselves not irreversible. Taking preliminary remediation steps or delaying the in-
troduction of new technologies may incur costs, but can be reversed when information on safety or risk
become available. To extricate “precaution” from controversy, advocates now refer to “precautionary
approaches” rather than a “principle”. 
Ideally, environmental health policy ought to reflect scientific consensus and risk assessment and
management. Risk assessment is never completely free of uncertainties, and often it is necessary to ar-
ticulate policies when science and risk assessment have yet to provide clear answers. I view risk as-
sessment and precaution as complementary, rather than opposite approaches. There are many environ-
mental health issues where uncertainties abound, and the role of endocrine active substances (EASs)
and their consequences are fraught with uncertainties. The consequences of uncontrolled exposure can
be significant, at least to individuals, yet the difficulty of demonstrating or validating connections be-
tween chemical and consequences, remains challenging, particularly in epidemiologic studies of hu-
mans. Since Colburn et al. [1] popularized the issue of “endocrine disruptors”, opponents have argued
that the much higher dose effects of intrinsic hormones such as estradiol (E2) or pharmacologic hor-
mones, would mask or vitiate any possible effects of the environmental estrogens. This very point, how-
ever, strengthens the argument for a precautionary approach. The controversy over epidemiologic stud-
ies  of  hormone  replacement  therapy—where  studies  have  involved  many  thousands  of
women—highlight the difficulty of arriving at scientific consensus. The main issue involves resolving
the uncertain benefits vs. the uncertain harms [2,3]. 
EPIDEMIOLOGIC STUDIES OF ENVIRONMENTAL EASs
Although there are abundant epidemiologic studies of endogenous hormones and pharmacologic use of
hormones (e.g., diethylstilbestrol and hormone replacement therapy), epidemiologic studies of en-
docrine affects in humans from environmental contaminants are relatively limited [4]. The organochlo-
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production. In humans, exposure to the pesticide DDT appeared to impair lactation in both U.S. and
Mexican  women  [5].  Exposures  to  polychlorinated  diphenyls  and  dibenzofurans  in  the  Yu-Cheng
(Taiwan 1978–79) disaster, was associated with a variety of developmental deficits including shortened
penises [6], a finding reminiscent of Florida alligators exposed to organochlorines [7]. Bertazzi et al.
[8] reported a low rate of breast and endometrial cancer in women exposed to dioxin after the Seveso
(Italy) explosion, raising the question of an antiestrogenic effect of dioxin. The putative thyroid effects
following an accidental exposure to polybrominated biphenyl compounds proved elusive [9]. Recently,
Goh et al. [10] reported a complex relationship between occupational exposure to trichloroethylene and
insulin levels, with no pattern for steroid levels. Probably the greatest recent controversy has been over
the proposed relation of organochlorines to breast cancer, summarized by Arab (Topic 3.2). 
PREMISE
In the face of controversy over the meaning of animal and human studies, the delay in reaching con-
sensus, and the possibility of irreversible harm, the precautionary approach is viewed as a way of re-
ducing exposure to EASs. The alternative wait-and-see approach, anticipates reassuring results when
epidemiologic studies on human health impacts are finally completed decades from now. This paper ex-
amines the limits of epidemiology and why even apparently reassuring results (i.e., statistically nega-
tive or inconclusive) cannot be the sole factor influencing risk management. I arrive at the same con-
clusion as Tukker (2002), that epidemiology has “a limited role in leading to preventive action”. I
identify almost a dozen reasons for this limitation, only a few of which will be discussed here.
For the purpose of this paper I will assume that in the absence of a precautionary approach, no
regulatory action would be taken without convincing epidemiologic evidence of causation, usually in
the form of multiple, statistically significant studies in relevant populations.
Table 1 Aspects of the epidemiology literature which delay consensus on causation OR “Why epidemiology
stacks the deck”. 
INTRINSIC TO METHODOLOGY
Alpha of 0.05 is too restrictive (avoiding type I error seems more important than avoiding type II error).
Focus on confidence limits retains the 0.05 level. 
Willingness to question statistically significant results if sample size small.
Misclassification biases toward the null hypothesis, making type II error more likely.
Participation bias reduces power. 
Multiple comparison corrections, over-correct, making type II error more likely. 
Tendency to use two-tailed test, when one-tailed test is warranted makes type II error more likely.
Confounders are always available to take the blame and vitiate an association or delay its acceptance.
EXTRINSIC TO METHODOLOGY
Population size imposes a limit on power.
Opposition to meta-analysis.
Human health effects may have long latency.
Epidemiologic studies take several to many years to plan, execute, and publish.
Large-scale epidemiologic studies are prohibitively expensive.
EPIDEMIOLOGY “TO THE RESCUE?”
Before embarking on a critique of epidemiology from one who teaches the subject, it is important to
recognize its value. In many aspects of environmental health, data obtained in animals are viewed with
suspicion or skepticism when applied to humans. In the area of carcinogenesis, an agent that causes can-
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carcinogen. But only epidemiologic studies can validate definition as a “known” human carcinogen. In
risk assessment, for example, there is a large and growing literature on the means and limitations of ex-
trapolating from animal data to humans. And interspecies extrapolation is one of the main areas of un-
certainty [11].
Epidemiology affords the opportunity to eliminate this uncertainty. Studies on asbestos and can-
cer, for example, have mainly been accomplished in humans. Likewise, arsenic and cancer are based on
human data, since this is one carcinogen for which no animal model exists [12]. But the expectation that
epidemiology can eliminate uncertainty and provide convincing answers for all audiences for all prob-
lems is an illusion. Epidemiology has severe limitations imposed by costs, methodology, and available
populations [13].
INTRINSIC METHODOLOGIC ISSUES
Hypothesis testing in epidemiology and toxicology 
In the mid-1900s, hypothesis testing emerged as a central paradigm in science. Scientists developed an
idea or hypothesis, framed it in terms of a null hypothesis (Ho), gathered data observationally or ex-
perimentally, analyzed the data, and rejected or failed to reject the null hypothesis. Since the early 20th
century, the 0.05 level was arbitrarily used as the criterion for rejecting the null hypothesis, so that re-
jecting the Ho at the alpha level of 0.05, meant that there was only a 5 % chance or one chance in 20
that the Ho was actually true (or should not have been rejected) [14]. This amounts to a 5 % probabil-
ity of making a type I error (a false positive or rejecting the Ho when it is true and should not be re-
jected). 
There are many fields where being 95 % percent confident of an experimental result is desirable
or even necessary, but it is not a universal necessity. Moreover, this form of hypothesis testing does not
allow an a priori definition of the converse probability of making a type II error, failing to reject the null
hypothesis when it is false. This is contingent on the power of a study, power being the probability that
if the Ho is false, the study will generate data that rejects the Ho. Rarely is power addressed in scien-
tific publications, and often it cannot easily be calculated retrospectively. However, a power of 80 % is
often considered desirable, meaning that even in a well-designed study, one has a 20 % chance of mak-
ing a type II error. Thus, in the evolution of hypothesis testing, avoiding a type I error became more im-
portant—approximately four times more important—than avoiding a type II error. This means, in ef-
fect, that the deck is stacked against detecting an effect that is real. 
Consider an example where drug A is being developed as a cure for disease D. A cautious investor
might insist on being 95 % confident that A is indeed effective against D, but a consumer suffering from
D would be content with a much lower level of confidence, such as 80 % or perhaps even 51 %. Thus,
the traditional alpha of 0.05 is merely a statistical convention, not an absolute threshold for significance. 
Hypothesis testing applies equally to toxicology and epidemiology, but in the former, at least, the
experimenter has the capability—though not always the resources—to design studies of sufficient
power. 
Hypothesis testing has dominated the thinking of most scientists alive today. But simple hypoth-
esis testing vis-à-vis the Ho, is already being replaced. Computerized techniques yielding absolute es-
timates of probability, afford new ways of looking at scientific data and providing confidence intervals
around point estimates. 
What does statistically significant mean
When we require a study to be statistically significant we look to see whether Ho is rejected at some a
priori alpha level, usually the 0.05 level. Where effects are subtle or power is low, lack of statistical sig-
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but sobering. Far too many epidemiologic studies lack the power to reject the Ho of no association.
Negative studies abound, with p values in the range of 0.06 to 0.20 which are interpreted as “negative”
or “not significant”, but which are actually potentially positive studies which simply lacked power.
Indeed, performing a study that lacks power may be unethical, unless one can clearly indicate the lack
of power. 
Alternative alphas
Perhaps the easiest way to deal with the inherent statistical bias favoring type II errors in epidemiology
is to set alternative alpha values or ignore alpha altogether. With small sample sizes and low power, an
alpha of 0.05 is an invitation to a false-negative study. Setting alpha at 0.10 has been shown as a rea-
sonable basis when a one-tailed test should have been invoked. It is also reasonable when a study lacks
power to reject at the 0.05 level. In any case, readers should look with suspicion on “negative” studies
particularly where p values are in the range of 0.05 to 0.10. Dispensing with alpha altogether is also rea-
sonable, since modern statistical programs can calculate an absolute P value for any statistic. It is sim-
ple enough to publish the result and the P value and let the readers bring their own interpretation to the
data. 
CONFIDENCE LIMITS
Confidence limits have been extensively used in biometrics for nearly 20 years, with almost all epi-
demiologic publications on relative risks or odds ratios, including the 95 % confidence limits. If the
confidence limits include 1 (i.e., the lower 95th % CL < 1), then this is interpreted as not statistically
significant at the 0.05 level. Taking a hypothetical point estimate of 2.0 (95 % CL 0.5, 8.0), it is equally
likely that the true value is 8.0 as it is that it is 0.5, and it is more likely than not that the true point es-
timate is above 1.0. Therefore, slavish reliance on confidence limits can be just as deceiving as simply
rejecting or failing to reject the Ho.
Possible decision rule for those who insist on 0.05
• If Ho is rejected at the 0.05 level, then regulate or prevent exposure.
• If Ho is not rejected at the 0.05 level but the power is not adequate, then regulate or prevent ex-
posure. 
• If Ho is not rejected at the 0.05 level and power is adequate, then no regulation or prevention
needed at this time [15].
Biological significance vs. statistical significance 
One commonly hears that a particular study yields a statistically significant result, “but is it biologically
significant?” That is, even in the face of statistical significance, readers may question the meaning of a
result. It is important that the converse question gets equal billing—“even if it isn’t statistically signif-
icant, does that mean that it’s not biologically significant?” One of the commonest reasons for not
achieving statistical significance is lack of power in the study design, usually because of small sample
size. If a study achieves statistical significance (rejects the Ho), then it cannot, by definition lack power,
even though the results may remain open to question and confirmation by additional studies. 
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Not only does an alpha of 0.05 carry with it an unacceptably high probability of making a type II error,
but there is another barrier imposed. Once one undertakes a study, particularly an expensive epidemio-
logic study, it is desirable to investigate as many endpoints or as many exposures as possible. Thus, if
one is studying the effect of soy milk formulas on infant development comparing soy- to cow-based or
breast-fed babies, a series of endpoints might be considered including height attainment, weight for
height, bone ossification, cognitive development, and gonadal and genital development. If for example,
only the latter were statistically significant at the 0.05 level, one might interpret this as evidence for a
phytoestrogen effect. But skeptics would argue, “no”, when you have six endpoints that are being tested,
that increases the chance that any one of them might emerge as “significant” by chance alone, therefore
you have to correct for multiple comparisons. Statisticians apply post hoc tests for multiple compar-
isons, for example, the Bonferroni test. 
However, if you consider that each of the six hypotheses is an independent null hypothesis, any
one of which might be biologically as well as statistically significant, it is apparent, that a multiple com-
parison test merely increases the probability of a type II error and is inherently fallacious. Rothman [16]
provides a detailed statistical treatise on why one should not correct for multiple comparisons in most
epidemiologic studies. 
Confounders
Unlike multiple comparisons, confounding is a real complication in interpreting epidemiologic studies.
There are many sources of confounding. When the study population is large and resources unlimited, it
is often possible to stratify samples and correct for confounding. In reality, however, confounding often
cannot be eliminated in a single study, and critics are quick to seize upon this. Confounding arises when
both the independent variable (e.g., soy milk) and the dependent variable (growth rate) are correlated
with a third variable that is not tested or testable. Socioeconomic status (SES) is a frequent confounder.
If people with higher SES are more likely to go to pediatricians who recommend soy milk (more ex-
pensive) and also enjoy better nutrition and medical care, then a relation between soy and growth rate
would be confounded by SES, and this might obscure a negative relationship between soy and growth,
if SES had been corrected for. 
Authors, editors, referees, or agencies, invoke confounding as a way of explaining or undermin-
ing positive results. In its famous study of dioxin exposure and cancer in 10 industries, the National
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health qualified its positive study by noting that “we cannot ex-
clude the possible contribution of factors such as smoking and occupational exposure to other chemi-
cals,” even though the nature of the study design made confounding highly unlikely [17]. More recent
papers [18] attempt to quantify the possible impact that confounders might have on a relative risk (RR)
or odds ratio (OR).
Misclassification bias
In any epidemiologic study where an exposed and referent population are compared, it is assumed that
most or all of those in the exposed population were actually exposed while most or all of the referent
population were unexposed. It is apparent that this is rarely likely to be the case. In an industrial-based
study, not all workers have the same exposure. In a study of fish-eating populations exposed to mercury
in the Seychelles and Faroes, not all families ate the same large quantities of fish. Where possible epi-
demiologists try to rank exposures, creating at least a crude dose–response relationship. In addition to
exposure misclassification, there can be outcome misclassification. Some people with the disease may
be overlooked. Other people may be ascribed a disease that they did not have. This is particularly a
problem with death certificate studies of mortality causes. Any random misclassification in exposure or
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absolutely ascertain exposure, this is a nearly universal conservative bias. 
Subject protection and institutional review boards
Some historical epidemiologic studies, most notably the Tuskeegee syphillis study, showed that subjects
in epidemiologic studies might be placed in jeopardy by the study itself. Even in controlled clinical tri-
als, subjects on placebos may be denied promising therapies. Therefore, following the World Medical
Association’s Declaration of Helsinki [20], human subjects protection and institutional review boards
(IRBs)  emerged,  and  their  review  is  now  required  for  every  study  involving  human  subjects.
Increasingly, IRBs are tightening the standards for epidemiologic studies. In some cases, full disclosure
of a study’s purpose may create additional biases by influencing whether subjects participate or how
they respond. There is an increasing concern in the public health community that IRBs are jeopardiz-
ing the future of important areas of epidemiologic research, and it may become impossible to expect
epidemiology to ever address the questions now posed of it. 
Participation bias
One consequence of increased requirements posed by IRBs is a reduction in participation rates. In tox-
icology, experimental rodents are not given a choice about participating in studies. Most epidemiologic
studies require consent of the subjects, at least a willingness to answer questions or provide blood sam-
ples. This is now being extended to review of records of past illnesses, where no physical harm to sub-
jects occurs. Some subjects, particularly African Americans, are suspicious of any epidemiologic stud-
ies and refuse to participate, thereby leading to the under-representation in all studies and the lack of
ethnic-specific information. Participation bias stacks the deck in two ways. It reduces the sample size,
thereby reducing the power of the study. It is always a source of suspicion in interpreting the results
(whether negative or positive). Thus, a positive study with a high refusal rate may be dismissed on the
grounds that the results were influenced by selection or participation bias.
EXTRINSIC EPIDEMIOLOGY ISSUES
Population limitations
A major limitation of epidemiology is that for any give type of exposure, the population that can be
studied is not infinite. For example, only a few thousand people are occupationally exposed to putative
xenoestrogens. The tobacco industry took delight in claiming that the cancers attributable to smoking
were probably due to alcohol consumption since the two exposures were highly correlated. Finding
smokers who consumed little or no alcohol was challenging, and finding populations with neither, even
more so. If there are only a few hundred people exposed to a particular chemical, then power is limited
by the available universe, even if all participated. 
Uneven receptor populations
Risk assessment and standard setting often take into account that among humans a subset (usually ill-
defined) may be at substantially greater than average risk. A common default value of 10 is used, as-
suming that susceptible people are 10 times more vulnerable than average. Epidemiologic studies may
or may not incorporate susceptible individuals, and the proportion of susceptibles in a study may vary
greatly. In the absence of specific investigations (such as genotyping) this proportion is unknown. If the
proportion is low, the impact of an exposure will be underestimated; if the proportion of susceptibles is
high the impact may be overestimated. This is another type of misclassification.
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in the exposed population militates against detecting an effect, even when the same percentage is pres-
ent in the controls. For example, a study of breast cancer that includes a large number of Asian women
would be biased toward the null [18]. 
Meta-analysis and the precautionary principle
Meta-analysis offers several ways of combining studies, each of which alone lacks power, but which in
combination may generate sufficient power to allow confidence in the outcome. Despite initial skepti-
cism [22], meta-analyses are performed with increasing frequency and can be used to demonstrate or
refute a proposed association. Often, however, meta-analysis does not provide a definitive answer as
Hebert-Croteau [23] concluded in an analysis of estrogen and colon cancer: “Inadequate assessment of
exposure, poor control of confounding factors, and changing patterns of use over time might have con-
tributed to the slow emergence of this association postulated almost two decades ago. Additional large
studies are needed to replicate this finding and explain the exact mechanism of this putative protective
effect.”
CONCLUSION
It is this last conclusion that highlights the need for precautionary approaches to many environmental
health issues, including endocrine active substances. Epidemiologic studies are slow, often weak, and
seldom conclusive, and decades may be required to reach consensus. Several standard defaults in epi-
demiology stack the deck against detecting associations, particularly weak associations, making it much
more likely that a false Ho will be accepted (type II error) than that a true Ho will be rejected (type I
error). The failure to report power, the setting of alpha at the artificially high default of 0.05, correcting
unnecessarily for multiple comparisons, or blaming positive effects on hidden confounders are all ways
of making detection of biologically significant associations quite unlikely. Faced with this problem, it
is not only reasonable, but desirable to take effective precautionary actions to mitigate exposures to pu-
tatively hazardous materials, while awaiting additional scientific evidence, particularly when the con-
sequences of inaction or laissez-faire, may be serious or irreversible. 
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